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http://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/humbiol_preprints/66
Nicholas Wade and Race: Building a Scientific Façade 
 
Jennifer Raff 
 
A Troublesome Inheritance: Genes, Race and Human History, by Nicholas Wade. New 
York: Penguin Press, 2013. x + 278 pp. 978-1-5942-0446-3 (hardcover). US $27.95. 
 
For he will say to himself that he has no right to give names to objects which he 
cannot define. 
—Charles Darwin, The Descent of Man 
 
Do “races” exist as meaningful biological categories?1 Physical anthropologists and 
human biologists have been studying race (e.g., blacks vs. whites, or Europeans vs. 
Asians) for centuries. For most of that time they subscribed to the perspective that race 
was a taxonomic category, and they sought to identify the biological traits (e.g., cranial 
shape or skin color) that characterized and defined these different groups. This 
perspective assumed that each individual was a member of a single racial category, that 
the differences between racial categories were biological, and that these categories were 
predictive of other traits like ancestry, temperament, intelligence, or health (Linnaeus 
1758; Morton 1839; Hooton 1939). 
 But it gradually became clear that this classificatory approach was not 
scientifically sound. Grouping people by skin color into “continental races” (Africans, 
Asians, Europeans) did not produce the same result as grouping people by skull shape or 
by such traits as susceptibility to sickle cell disease (Livingstone 1962; Relethford 2009). 
Furthermore, as scientists began to study human variation with the tools of genetics, it 
became obvious that human genetic variation does not divide humans into a few discrete 
groups. There are virtually no sharp boundaries, either with physical features or with 
patterns of genetic diversity, that show where one population “ends” and the next 
“begins” (Livingstone 1962; Lewontin 1972; Jorde et al. 2000; Relethford 2009; Long et 
al. 2009; Templeton 2013). 
 These observations have led the majority of physical anthropologists, human 
biologists, human geneticists, and sociologists in recent decades to conclude that the 
racial groups we recognize are social categories constructed in a specific cultural and 
historical setting, even if we consider physical features when categorizing people 
(Pigliucci 2013; Duster 2005). These social categories have biological consequences; for 
example, someone who experiences the stress of racism may be more likely to develop 
high blood pressure and hypertension than someone who does not (Gravlee 2009; 
Sullivan 2013). 
 However, according to former New York Times science writer Nicholas Wade, we 
should never have stopped thinking of race as a biological taxonomic category. In his 
book A Troublesome Inheritance, Wade takes it upon himself to educate scientists about 
the errors of our interpretations of human genetic diversity. 
 Wade claims that the latest genomic findings actually support dividing humans 
into discrete races and that the genetic makeup of different races contributes to behavioral 
and economic disparities. In a spectacular failure of logic, he asserts that those who 
disagree that races are meaningful biological categories in humans must also think that 
human populations do not differ genetically or have not been affected by evolution. 
 There is a lot to criticize in this book, particularly Wade’s imaginative storytelling 
in chapters 6–10 (“a much more speculative arena,” as he puts it [15]). He explains that 
English populations have a “willingness to save and delay gratification,” which “seems 
considerably weaker in tribal societies” (184–185), and these differences must be 
genetically based, despite his admission that “the genetic underpinnings of human social 
behavior are for the most part still unknown” (15). In chapter 8, he asserts that Jews are 
adapted for capitalism in a manner analogous to the Eskimo’s adaptation to survival in an 
Arctic environment (214—an assertion unsupported by scientific evidence, to put it 
mildly. (Wade seems to be unaware of the consequences of laws prohibiting Jews from 
owning land and farming over much of Europe for centuries—and instead speculates that 
“the adaptation of Jews to capitalism is another such evolutionary process” [214].) But the 
central foundation of Wade’s argument is the scientific justification of the folk 
classification of race. He writes: “At least at the level of continental populations, races 
can be distinguished genetically, and this is sufficient to establish that they exist” (122). 
If Wade is right and races are distinct biological categories, then we would reasonably 
expect that they would be unambiguously different from each other genetically and 
physically (as well as behaviorally, according to Wade). One should be able to define 
each race with a set of objective criteria, which could be used by any person to 
independently reach the same classifications (and number of classifications) as Wade. 
Furthermore, these categories should have predictive power; that is, features that define 
race should be in concordance with new discoveries of genetic diversity. 
 What Is Race, According to Wade? 
Wade never provides a clear definition of “race” in this book. He tries to rely instead on 
loose associations rather than definitive characteristics, which forces him (like Hooton 
1918, 1931) to conclude both that physical traits define race but that the traits can vary 
from person to person: “Races are identified by clusters of traits, and to belong to a 
certain race, it’s not necessary to possess all of the identifying traits” (121). 
 With such a shifty, casual footing, it’s no surprise that Wade’s conclusions are 
unsound. He can’t keep the number of races straight (see Table 1). Wade can’t settle on a 
definite number of races because he can’t come up with a consistent, rigorous definition 
of what “race” means. He freely uses such terms as “major race,” “race,” “subrace,” 
“group,” and “population” but doesn’t provide any serious, objective ways to distinguish 
among these terms for arbitrary groupings of people.2 
 Wade seems to realize the contradictory claims of his premise but tries to have it 
both ways: “Such an arrangement, of portioning human variation into five continental 
races, is to some extent arbitrary. But it makes practical sense. The three major races are 
easy to recognize. The five-way division matches the known events of human population 
history. And, most significant of all, the division by continent is supported by genetics” 
(94). 
 To support this claim, Wade relies heavily on a study published by Rosenberg et 
al. (2002) that used a program called Structure to group people based on similarities in 
short tandem repeat markers distributed across the genome. He notes that the program 
identified five major clusters in this 2002 study, which corresponded to the major 
geographic regions of the world (Africa, Eurasia, East Asia, Oceania, and America). 
Therefore, Wade argues, these results clearly show that humans are divided up into racial 
categories that match continents. 
 Charles Murray, coauthor with Richard Herrnstein of the book The Bell Curve 
(1994)—which claimed that genetically based differences in intelligence between blacks 
and whites (as measured by IQ) could explain social and economic disparities, and was 
widely criticized (see Alland et al. 1996)—recently reviewed Wade’s book in the Wall 
Street Journal. He stated that “a computer given a random sampling of bits of DNA that 
are known to vary among humans—from among the millions of them—will cluster them 
into groups that correspond to the self-identified race or ethnicity of the subjects. This is 
not because the software assigns the computer that objective but because those are the 
clusters that provide the best statistical fit” (Murray 2014) But Wade and Murray are both 
wrong. While the program Structure can be a useful tool for inferring individual ancestry, 
it requires (1) an understanding of the assumptions inherent in the clustering algorithms 
and (2) cautious interpretation of the results. Because of these caveats, careful and 
rigorous scientists generally view the “best” clustering scheme as a starting point for 
generating testable hypotheses about ancestry and population history, not as the basis for 
slicing the species into a discrete number of groups or races. 
 Structure is a program that assigns individual genotypes to hypothetical 
populations or ancestry groupings (Bolnick 2008). It assumes that populations are in 
Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium and that loci are not in linkage disequilibrium (Pritchard et 
al. 2000). Results produced from this analytical tool are extremely sensitive to a number 
of factors, including models (i.e., correlated vs. uncorrelated allele frequencies), the type 
and number of genetic variants studied, and the number of populations included in the 
analysis (Rosenberg et al. 2005). The authors of Structure also caution that it will produce 
rather arbitrary clusters when sampled populations exhibit clinal patterns of genetic 
variation due to isolation by distance (Pritchard et al. 2000). This description applies to 
most human populations, so it makes the results of Structure problematic and difficult to 
interpret in many cases. In fact, Rosenberg et al. (2005) explicitly stated: “Our evidence 
for clustering should not be taken as evidence of our support of any particular concept of 
‘biological race.’” 
 Contrary to Wade’s assertion, Structure didn’t simply identify five clusters in the 
Rosenberg et al. (2002) data set. It also identified two, three, four, six, and seven 
clusters.3 Why? Researchers using Structure have to define the number (K) of clusters in 
advance, because that’s what the program requires. So where does Wade get the idea that 
K = 5 is the most statistically supported number of clusters? Not from Rosenberg et al. 
(2002). 
 There are a few statistical methods for identifying which choice of K is “best.” 
Structure itself provides an estimate of the log probability of the data for each value of K 
[LnP(D)]. However, using this estimate to choose among values of K is not without some 
controversy—the authors of Structure caution that it “merely provides an ad hoc 
approximation” and the “biological interpretation of K may not be straightforward” 
(Pritchard et al. 2010: 15). In their simulation study, Evanno et al. (2005) observed that 
LnP(D) wasn’t necessarily maximized at the correct value for K. They recommend 
instead the measure of ∆K, or the second-order rate of change of the likelihood function 
with respect to K (essentially, how much better each value of K is compared with the 
preceding value of K). Many researchers follow this practice, although it has been argued 
against (Waples and Gaggiotti 2006). 
 Importantly, Rosenberg et al. (2002, 2005) do not report the LnP(D) (or ∆K) for 
any of the values for K, so those articles do not tell us which number of clusters are most 
likely present in the data set. Bolnick (2008) reports information about the unpublished 
LnP(D) values: 
No single value of K clearly maximized the probability of the observed data. 
Probabilities increased sharply from K=1 to K=4 but were fairly similar for values 
of K ranging from 4 to 20. The probability of the observed data was higher for 
K=6 than for smaller values of K, but not as high for some replicates of larger 
values of K. The highest Pr (X|K) was associated with a particular replicate of 
K=16, but that value of K was also associated with very low probabilities when 
the individuals were grouped into 16 clusters in other ways. Consequently it is 
uncertain which number of genetic clusters best fits this data set, but there is no 
clear evidence that K=6 is the best estimate. (Bolnick 2008, 77; based on 
information provided by personal communication from N. Rosenberg) 
Wade does not seem to have read any of the papers critical of interpretations of 
Rosenberg et al.’s (2002) data as evidence for human racial divisions, such as Bolnick 
(2008) or Templeton (2013). Nor does he seem to have noticed Rosenberg et al.’s (2002) 
omission of any statistical evaluation of the different K values. They do highlight “six 
main genetic clusters, five of which correspond to major geographic regions” within the 
abstract, making one wonder whether Wade carefully read the rest of the paper. I would 
like to believe that a veteran science reporter would not be so cavalier as to selectively 
read only sources that support his position. Wade evidently seems to like K = 5 simply 
because it matches the number of inhabited continents: “It might be reasonable to elevate 
the Indian and Middle Eastern groups to the level of major races, making seven in all. But 
then many more subpopulations could be declared races, so to keep things simple, the 
five-race, continent-based scheme seems the most practical for most purposes” (100). 
Practical. Simple. Wade wants us to cut up human diversity into five races not because 
that’s what the statistical analyses support but because thinking about it as a gradient is 
hard. 
 Nobody (least of all contributors to this journal!) is denying that humans vary 
physically and genetically. But observed patterns of human genetic diversity simply don’t 
fit with any scientifically viable definition of race as a taxonomic unit (Templeton 2013). 
In order to find biological support for folk classifications of race, Wade has decided that 
certain patterns of variation are more important than others. The five-part division of 
races seems “logical” to Wade because there are five continents. Anticipating confusion 
on this point, he claims: “Those who assert that human races don’t exist like to point to 
the many, mutually inconsistent classification schemes that have recognized anywhere 
from 3 to 60 races. But the lack of agreement doesn’t mean that races don’t exist, only 
that it is a matter of judgment as to how to define them” (92, emphasis mine). 
 So, rather than being defined by empirical criteria, as Wade had asserted so 
confidently earlier in the book, it really is just a subjective judgment call. The differences 
between groups are so subtle and gradual that no objective lines can be drawn, so Wade 
draws his own on the basis of his own preconceptions. In other words, he can’t define 
distinct races. He just knows them when he sees them. 
 There is a great deal more in this book that deserves critique, such as Wade’s 
assertion that the genetic differences between human groups determine behavioral 
differences, resurrecting the specter of “national character” and “racial temperaments.” 
But as I have shown here, it’s all pseudoscientific rubbish because he can’t justify his 
first and primary point: that the human racial groups we recognize today are scientifically 
meaningful, distinct biological divisions of humans. 
 Finally, it is worth noting that, throughout the book, Wade repeatedly calls 
attention to the fact that his view on race is contrary to that of anthropologists and 
sociologists. In responses to criticisms of his book (including an earlier online version of 
this review) he insists that “by denying the existence of race, social scientists are 
intimidating biologists from pursuing this path” (Wade 2014)—a claim belied by the 
robust criticism of his book by geneticists, evolutionary biologists, and physical 
anthropologists). This ploy is a variation on the Galileo fallacy: the fact that one bravely 
holds a minority view in science is considered to be sufficient evidence of the worth of 
one’s position. I have seen it used over and over again in responses to criticisms of 
pseudoscience, and it is no more persuasive for Wade than it is for creationists or 
homeopaths. 
 
Notes 
1. This review incorporates material that has previously appeared in the Huffington Post 
(http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jennifer-raff/nicholas-wade-and-race-building-a-
scientific-facade_b_5375137.html) and Violent Metaphors 
(http://violentmetaphors.com/2014/05/21/nicholas-wade-and-race-building-a-scientific-
facade/). 
2. See Agustín Fuentes’s online debate with Wade sponsored by the American 
Anthropological Association, available at 
https://aaanetevents.webex.com/ec0701lsp11/eventcenter/recording/recordAction.do?the
Action=poprecord&AT=pb&internalRecordTicket=4832534b000000021dea9fff10e4adb
e92477105faf7337d575f8022218d05ffd3d0cede6594483c&renewticket=0&isurlact=true
&recordID=8614987&apiname=lsr.php&format=short&needFilter=false&&SP=EC&rID
=8614987&RCID=e801bfd96855006077205e3d2e023699&siteurl=aaanetevents&actapp
name=ec0701lsp11&actname=%2Feventcenter%2Fframe%2Fg.do&rnd=5083844903&e
ntappname=url0201lsp11&entactname=%2FnbrRecordingURL.do. 
3. It actually identified up to 20 divisions, but clusters 1–7 are the primary ones discussed 
in Rosenberg et al. (2002). The same study also divided their worldwide sample up into 
regions, and then ran Structure within those regions, to look at finer-scale population 
structure (see Bolnick 2008). 
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 Table 1. Various Numbers of Races Referred to by Wade in A Troublesome Inheritance 
Number of 
Races 
Definition Page 
3 Africans, East Asians, Europeans, “as well as many smaller groups” 2 
3 Africans, East Asians, Caucasians (doesn’t mention Native Americans) 4 
5 Africans, East Asians, Caucasians, Native Americans, 
Australians/Papua New Guineans 
64 
3 Caucasians, East Asians, Africans 70 
7 Five continental races, Indian subcontinent, people of the Middle East 96 
5 or 7 Five continental groups but two additional groups recognized 
genetically: Central/Southern Asia and Middle East 
100 
4 European, East Asian, American Indian, African 115 
3 “Major races” 121 
5 “Major races” 242 
 
